Principles of Political Economy

John Stuart Mill

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Lalor’s “Cyclopædia of Political Science” (1881-84) is devoted to articles on political science, political economy, and American history. Coquelin and Guillaumin’s “Dictionnaire de l’économie politique” (1851-1853, third edition, 1864), in two large volumes. REPORTS AND STATISTICS. The “Compendiums of the Census” for 1840, 1850, 1860, and 1870, are desirable. The volumes of the tenth census (1880) are of great value for all questions; as is also F. A. Walker’s “Statistical Atlas” (1874). The United States Bureau of Statistics issues quarterly statements; and annually a report on “Commerce and Navigation,” and another on the “Internal Commerce of the United States.” The “Statistical Abstract” is an annual publication, by the same department, compact and useful. It dates only from 1878. The Director of the Mint issues an annual report dealing with the precious metals and the circulation. Its tables are important. The Comptroller of the Currency (especially during the administration of J. J. Knox) has given important annual reports upon the banking systems of the United States. The reports of the Secretary of the Treasury deal with the general finances of the United States. These, with the two last mentioned, are bound together in the volume of “Finance Reports,” but often shorn of their tables. There are valuable special reports to Congress of commissioners on the tariff, shipping, and other subjects, published by the Government. The report on the “International Monetary Conference of 1878” contains a vast quantity of material on monetary questions. The British parliamentary documents contain several annual “Statistical Abstracts” of the greatest value, of which the one relating to other European states is peculiarly convenient and useful. These can always be purchased at given prices. A. R. Spofford’s “American Almanac” is an annual of great usefulness. Preliminary Remarks. Writers on Political Economy profess to teach, or to investigate, the nature of Wealth, and the laws of its production and distribution; including, directly or remotely, the operation of all the causes by which the condition of mankind, or of any society of human beings, in respect to this universal object of human desire, is made prosperous or the reverse. It will be noticed that political economy does not include ethics, legislation, or the science of government. The results of political economy are offered to the statesman, who reaches a conclusion after weighing them in connection with moral and political considerations. Political Economy is distinct from Sociology; although it is common to include in the former everything which concerns social life. Some writers distinguish between the pure, or abstract science, and the applied art, and we can speak of a science of political economy only in the sense of a body of abstract laws or formulas. This, however, does not make political economy less practical than physics, for, after a principle is ascertained, its operation is to be observed in the same way that we study the force of gravitation in a falling stone, even when retarded by opposing forces. An economic force, or tendency, can be likewise distinctly observed, although other influences, working at the same time, prevent the expected effect from following its cause. It is, in short, the aim of political economy to investigate the laws which govern the phenomena of material wealth. (Cf. Cossa, “Guide,” chap. iii.) While the [Mercantile] system prevailed, it was assumed, either expressly or tacitly, in the whole policy of nations, that wealth consisted solely of money; or of the precious metals, which, when not already in the state of money, are capable of being directly converted into it. According to the doctrines then prevalent, whatever tended to heap up money or bullion in a country added to its wealth. More correctly the Mercantilists (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) held that where money was most plentiful, there would be found the greatest abundance of the necessaries of life.(100) Whatever sent the precious metals out of a country impoverished it. If a country possessed no gold or silver mines, the only industry by which it could be enriched was foreign trade, being the only one which could bring in money. Any branch of trade which was supposed to send out more money than it brought in, however ample and valuable might be the returns in another shape, was looked upon as a losing trade. Exportation of goods was favored and encouraged (even by means extremely onerous to the real resources of the country), because, the exported goods being stipulated to be paid for in money, it was hoped that the returns would actually be made in gold and silver. Importation of anything, other than the precious metals, was regarded as a loss to the nation of the whole price of the things imported; unless they were brought in to be re-exported at a profit, or unless, being the materials or instruments of some industry practiced in the country itself, they gave the power of producing exportable articles at smaller cost, and thereby effecting a larger exportation. The commerce of the world was looked upon as a struggle among nations, which could draw to itself the largest share of the gold and silver in existence; and in this competition no nation could gain anything, except by making others lose as much, or, at the least, preventing them from gaining it. The Mercantile Theory could not fail to be seen in its true character when men began, even in an imperfect manner, to explore into the foundations of things. Money, as money, satisfies no want; its worth to any one consists in its being a convenient shape in which to receive his incomings of all sorts, which incomings he afterwards, at the times which suit him best, converts into the forms in which they can be useful to him. The difference between a country with money, and a country altogether without it, would be only one of convenience; a saving of time and trouble, like grinding by water instead of by hand, or (to use Adam Smith’s illustration) like the benefit derived from roads; and to mistake money for wealth is the same sort of error as to mistake the highway, which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, for the house and lands themselves. Money, being the instrument of an important public and private purpose, is rightly regarded as wealth; but everything else which serves any human purpose, and which nature does not afford gratuitously, is wealth also. To be wealthy is to have a large stock of useful articles, or the means of purchasing them. Everything forms, therefore, a part of wealth, which has a power of purchasing; for which anything useful or agreeable would be given in exchange. Things for which nothing could be obtained in exchange, however useful or necessary they may be, are not wealth in the sense in which the term is used in Political Economy. Air, for example, though the most absolute of necessaries, bears no price in the market, because it can be obtained gratuitously; to accumulate a stock of it would yield no profit or advantage to any one; and the laws of its production and distribution are the subject of a very different study from Political Economy. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which air would be a part of wealth. If it became customary to sojourn long in places where the air does not naturally penetrate, as in diving-bells sunk in the sea, a supply of air artificially furnished would, like water conveyed into houses, bear a price: and, if from any revolution in nature the atmosphere became too scanty for the consumption, or could be monopolized, air might acquire a very high marketable value. In such a case, the possession of it, beyond his own wants, would be, to its owner, wealth; and the general wealth of mankind might at first sight appear to be increased, by what would be so great a calamity to them. The error would lie in not considering that, however rich the possessor of air might become at the expense of the rest of the community, all persons else would be poorer by all that they were compelled to pay for what they had before obtained without payment. Wealth, then, may be defined, all useful or agreeable things which possess exchangeable value; or, in other words, all useful or agreeable things except those which can be obtained, in the quantity desired, without labor or sacrifice. This is the usual definition of wealth. Henry George (see “Progress and Poverty,” pp. 34-37) regards wealth as consisting “of natural products that have been secured, moved, combined, separated, or in other ways _modified by human exertion_, so as to fit them for the gratification of human desires.... Nothing which Nature supplies to man without his labor is wealth.... All things which have an exchange value are, therefore, not wealth. Only such things can be wealth the production of which increases and the destruction of which decreases the aggregate of wealth.... Increase in land values does not represent increase in the common wealth, for what land-owners gain by higher prices the tenants or purchasers who must pay them will lose.” Jevons (“Primer,” p. 13) defines wealth very properly as what is transferable, limited in supply, and useful. F. A. Walker defines wealth as comprising “all articles of value and nothing else” (“Political Economy,” p. 5). Levasseur’s definition (“Précis,” p. 15) is, “all material objects possessing utility” (i.e., the power to satisfy a want). (Cf. various definitions in Roscher’s “Political Economy,” section 9, note 3.) Perry (“Political Economy,” p. 99) rejects the term _wealth_ as a clog to progress in the science, and adopts _property_ in its stead, defining it as that “which can be bought or sold.” Cherbuliez (“Précis,” p. 70) defines wealth as the material product of nature appropriated by labor for the wants of man. Carey (“Social Science,” i, 186) asserts that wealth consists in the power to command Nature’s services, including in wealth such intangible things as mental qualities. BOOK I. PRODUCTION. Chapter I. Of The Requisites Of Production. § 1. The Requisites of Production are Two: Labor, and Appropriate Natural Objects. There is a third requisite of production, capital (see page 58). Since the limitation to only two requisites applies solely to a primitive condition of existence, so soon as the element of _time_ enters into production, then a store of capital becomes necessary; that is, so soon as production requires such a term that during the operation the laborer can not at the same time provide himself with subsistence, then capital is a requisite of production. This takes place also under any general division of labor in a community. When one man is making a pin-head, he must be supplied with food by some person until the pins are finished and exchanged. Labor is either bodily or mental; or, to express the distinction more comprehensively, either muscular or nervous; and it is necessary to include in the idea, not solely the exertion itself, but all feelings of a disagreeable kind, all bodily inconvenience or mental annoyance, connected with the employment of one’s thoughts, or muscles, or both, in a particular occupation. The word “sacrifice” conveys a just idea of what the laborer undergoes, and it corresponds to the abstinence of the capitalist. Of the other requisite—appropriate natural objects—it is to be remarked that some objects exist or grow up spontaneously, of a kind suited to the supply of human wants. There are caves and hollow trees capable of affording shelter; fruits, roots, wild honey, and other natural products, on which human life can be supported; but even here a considerable quantity of labor is generally required, not for the purpose of creating, but of finding and appropriating them. Of natural powers, some are unlimited, others limited in quantity. By an unlimited quantity is of course not meant literally, but practically unlimited: a quantity beyond the use which can in any, or at least in present circumstances, be made of it. Land is, in some newly settled countries, practically unlimited in quantity: there is more than can be used by the existing population of the country, or by any accession likely to be made to it for generations to come. But, even there, land favorably situated with regard to markets, or means of carriage, is generally limited in quantity: there is not so much of it as persons would gladly occupy and cultivate, or otherwise turn to use. In all old countries, land capable of cultivation, land at least of any tolerable fertility, must be ranked among agents limited in quantity. Coal, metallic ores, and other useful substances found in the earth, are still more limited than land. For the present I shall only remark that, so long as the quantity of a natural agent is practically unlimited, it can not, unless susceptible of artificial monopoly, bear any value in the market, since no one will give anything for what can be obtained gratis. But as soon as a limitation becomes practically operative—as soon as there is not so much of the thing to be had as would be appropriated and used if it could be obtained for asking—the ownership or use of the natural agent acquires an exchangeable value. Rich lands in our Western Territories a few years ago could be had practically for the asking; but now, since railways and an increase of population have brought them nearer to the markets, they have acquired a distinct exchange value. The value of a commodity (it may be anticipated) is the quantity of other things for which it can be exchanged. When more water-power is wanted in a particular district than there are falls of water to supply it, persons will give an equivalent for the use of a fall of water. When there is more land wanted for cultivation than a place possesses, or than it possesses of a certain quality and certain advantages of situation, land of that quality and situation may be sold for a price, or let for an annual rent.