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To the majority of civilized countries gold and silver are foreign products: and the circumstances which govern the values of foreign products present some questions which we are not yet ready to examine. For the present, therefore, we must suppose the country which is the subject of our inquiries to be supplied with gold and silver by its own mines [as in the case of the United States], reserving for future consideration how far our conclusions require modification to adapt them to the more usual case.
Of the three classes into which commodities are divided—those absolutely limited in supply, those which may be had in unlimited quantity at a given cost of production, and those which may be had in unlimited quantity, but at an increasing cost of production—the precious metals, being the produce of mines, belong to the third class. Their natural value, therefore, is in the long run proportional to their cost of production in the most unfavorable existing circumstances, that is, at the worst mine which it is necessary to work in order to obtain the required supply. A pound weight of gold will, in the gold-producing countries, ultimately tend to exchange for as much of every other commodity as is produced at a cost equal to its own; meaning by its own cost the cost in labor and expense at the least productive sources of supply which the then existing demand makes it necessary to work. The average value of gold is made to conform to its natural value in the same manner as the values of other things are made to conform to their natural value. Suppose that it were selling above its natural value; that is, above the value which is an equivalent for the labor and expense of mining, and for the risks attending a branch of industry in which nine out of ten experiments have usually been failures. A part of the mass of floating capital which is on the lookout for investment would take the direction of mining enterprise; the supply would thus be increased, and the value would fall. If, on the contrary, it were selling below its natural value, miners would not be obtaining the ordinary profit; they would slacken their works; if the depreciation was great, some of the inferior mines would perhaps stop working altogether: and a falling off in the annual supply, preventing the annual wear and tear from being completely compensated, would by degrees reduce the quantity, and restore the value.
When examined more closely, the following are the details of the process: If gold is above its natural or cost value—the coin, as we have seen, conforming in its value to the bullion—money will be of high value, and the prices of all things, labor included, will be low. These low prices will lower the expenses of all producers; but, as their returns will also be lowered, no advantage will be obtained by any producer, except the producer of gold; whose returns from his mine, not depending on price, will be the same as before, and, his expenses being less, he will obtain extra profits, and will be stimulated to increase his production. _E converso_, if the metal is below its natural value; since this is as much as to say that prices are high, and the money expenses of all producers unusually great; for this, however, all other producers will be compensated by increased money returns; the miner alone will extract from his mine no more metal than before, while his expenses will be greater: his profits, therefore, being diminished or annihilated, he will diminish his production, if not abandon his employment.
In this manner it is that the value of money is made to conform to the cost of production of the metal of which it is made. It may be well, however, to repeat (what has been said before) that the adjustment takes a long time to effect, in the case of a commodity so generally desired and at the same time so durable as the precious metals. Being so largely used, not only as money but for plate and ornament, there is at all times a very large quantity of these metals in existence: while they are so slowly worn out that a comparatively small annual production is sufficient to keep up the supply, and to make any addition to it which may be required by the increase of goods to be circulated, or by the increased demand for gold and silver articles by wealthy consumers. Even if this small annual supply were stopped entirely, it would require many years to reduce the quantity so much as to make any very material difference in prices. The quantity may be increased much more rapidly than it can be diminished; but the increase must be very great before it can make itself much felt over such a mass of the precious metals as exists in the whole commercial world. And hence the effects of all changes in the conditions of production of the precious metals are at first, and continue to be for many years, questions of quantity only, with little reference to cost of production. More especially is this the case when, as at the present time, many new sources of supply have been simultaneously opened, most of them practicable by labor alone, without any capital in advance beyond a pickaxe and a week’s food, and when the operations are as yet wholly experimental, the comparative permanent productiveness of the different sources being entirely unascertained.
For the facts in regard to the production of the precious metals, see the investigation by Dr. Adolf Soetbeer,(230) from which Chart IX has been taken. It is worthy of careful study. The figures in each period, at the top of the respective spaces, give the average annual production during those years. The last period has been added by me from figures taken from the reports of the Director of the United States Mint. Other accessible sources, for the production of the precious metals, are the tables in the appendices to the Report of the Committee to the House of Commons on the “Depreciation of Silver” (1876); the French official Procès-Verbaux of the International Monetary Conference of 1881, which give Soetbeer’s figures to a later date than his publication above mentioned; the various papers in the British parliamentary documents; and the reports of the director of our mint. Since 1850 more gold has been produced than in the whole period preceding, from 1492 to 1850. Previous to 1849 the annual average product of gold, out of the total product of both gold and silver, was thirty-six per cent; for the twenty-six years ending in 1875, it has been seventy and one half per cent. The result has been a rise in gold prices certainly down to 1862,(231) as shown by the following chart. It will be observed how much higher the prices rose during the depression after 1858 than it was during a period of similar conditions after 1848. The result, it may be said, was predicted by Chevalier.(232)
Chart IX.
_Chart showing the Production of the Precious Metals, according to Value, from 1493 to 1879._
Years. Silver. Gold. Total. 1493-1520 $2,115,000 $4,045,500 $6,160,500 1521-1544 4,059,000 4,994,000 9,053,000 1545-1560 14,022,000 5,935,500 19,957,500 1561-1580 13,477,500 4,770,750 18,248,250 1581-1600 18,850,500 5,147,500 23,998,000 1601-1620 19,030,500 5,942,750 24,973,250 1621-1640 17,712,000 5,789,250 23,501,250 1641-1660 16,483,500 6,117,000 22,600,500 1661-1680 15,165,000 6,458,750 21,623,750 1681-1700 15,385,500 7,508,500 22,894,000 1701-1720 16,002,000 8,942,000 24,944,000 1721-1740 19,404,000 13,308,250 32,712,250 1741-1760 23,991,500 17,165,500 41,157,000 1761-1780 29,373,250 14,441,750 43,815,000 1781-1800 39,557,750 12,408,500 51,966,250 1801-1810 40,236,750 12,400,000 52,636,750 1811-1820 24,334,750 7,983,000 32,317,750 1821-1830 20,725,250 9,915,750 30,641,000 1831-1840 26,840,250 14,151,500 40,991,750 1841-1850 35,118,750 38,194,250 73,313,000 1851-1855 39,875,250 137,766,750 177,642,000 1856-1860 40,724,500 143,725,250 184,449,750 1861-1865 49,551,750 129,123,250 178,675,000 1866-1870 60,258,750 133,850,000 194,108,750 1871-1875 88,624,000 119,045,750 207,669,750 1876-1879 110,575,000 119,710,000 230,285,000
[Illustration: Rise of Average Gold Prices.]
Chart showing rise of average gold prices after the gold discoveries of 1849 to 1862.
The fall of prices from 1873 to 1879, owing to the commercial panic in the former year, however, is regarded, somewhat unjustly, in my opinion, as an evidence of an appreciation of gold. Mr. Giffen’s paper in the “Statistical Journal,” vol. xlii, is the basis on which Mr. Goschen founded an argument in the “Journal of the Institute of Bankers” (London), May, 1883, and which attracted considerable attention. On the other side, see Bourne, “Statistical Journal,” vol. xlii. The claim that the value of gold has risen seems particularly hasty, especially when we consider that after the panics of 1857 and 1866 the value of money rose, for reasons not affecting gold, respectively fifteen and twenty-five per cent.
The very thing for which the precious metals are most recommended for use as the materials of money—their _durability_—is also the very thing which has, for all practical purposes, excepted them from the law of cost of production, and caused their value to depend practically upon the law of demand and supply. Their durability is the reason of the vast accumulations in existence, and this it is which makes the annual product very small in relation to the whole existing supply, and so prevents its value from conforming, except after a long term of years, to the cost of production of the annual supply.
§ 3. This law, how related to the principle laid down in the preceding chapter.
Since, however, the value of money really conforms, like that of other things, though more slowly, to its cost of production, some political economists have objected altogether to the statement that the value of money depends on its quantity combined with the rapidity of circulation, which, they think, is assuming a law for money that does not exist for any other commodity, when the truth is that it is governed by the very same laws. To this we may answer, in the first place, that the statement in question assumes no peculiar law. It is simply the law of demand and supply, which is acknowledged to be applicable to all commodities, and which, in the case of money, as of most other things, is controlled, but not set aside, by the law of cost of production, since cost of production would have no effect on value if it could have none on supply. But, secondly, there really is, in one respect, a closer connection between the value of money and its quantity than between the values of other things and their quantity. The value of other things conforms to the changes in the cost of production, without requiring, as a condition, that there should be any actual alteration of the supply: the potential alteration is sufficient; and, if there even be an actual alteration, it is but a temporary one, except in so far as the altered value may make a difference in the demand, and so require an increase or diminution of supply, as a consequence, not a cause, of the alteration in value. Now, this is also true of gold and silver, considered as articles of expenditure for ornament and luxury; but it is not true of money. If the permanent cost of production of gold were reduced one fourth, it might happen that there would not be more of it bought for plate, gilding, or jewelry, than before; and if so, though the value would fall, the quantity extracted from the mines for these purposes would be no greater than previously. Not so with the portion used as money: that portion could not fall in value one fourth unless actually increased one fourth; for, at prices one fourth higher, one fourth more money would be required to make the accustomed purchases; and, if this were not forthcoming, some of the commodities would be without purchasers, and prices could not be kept up. Alterations, therefore, in the cost of production of the precious metals do not act upon the value of money except just in proportion as they increase or diminish its quantity; which can not be said of any other commodity. It would, therefore, I conceive, be an error, both scientifically and practically, to discard the proposition which asserts a connection between the value of money and its quantity.
There are cases, however, in which the _potential_ change of the precious metals affects their value as money in the same way that it affects the value of other things. Such a case was the change in the value of silver in 1876. The usual causes assigned for that serious fall in value were the greatly increased production from the mines of Nevada; the demonetization of silver by Germany; and the decreased demand for export to India. It is true that the exports of silver from England to India fell off from about $32,000,000 in 1871-1872 to about $23,000,000 in 1874-1875; but none of the increased Nevada silver was exported from the United States to London, nor had Germany put more than $30,000,000 of her silver on the market;(233) and yet the price of silver so fell that the depreciation amounted to 20-¼ per cent as compared with the average price between 1867 and 1872. The change in value, however, took place without any corresponding change in the actual quantity in circulation. The relation between prices and the quantities of the precious metals is, therefore, not so exact, certainly as regards silver, as Mr. Mill would have us believe; and thus their values conform more nearly to the general law of Demand and Supply in the same way that it affects things other than money.
It is evident, however, that the cost of production, in the long run, regulates the quantity; and that every country (temporary fluctuation excepted) will possess, and have in circulation, just that quantity of money which will perform all the exchanges required of it, consistently with maintaining a value conformable to its cost of production. The prices of things will, on the average, be such that money will exchange for its own cost in all other goods: and, precisely because the quantity can not be prevented from affecting the value, the quantity itself will (by a sort of self-acting machinery) be kept at the amount consistent with that standard of prices—at the amount necessary for performing, at those prices, all the business required of it.
Chapter VII. Of A Double Standard And Subsidiary Coins.
§ 1. Objections to a Double Standard.
Though the qualities necessary to fit any commodity for being used as money are rarely united in any considerable perfection, there are two commodities which possess them in an eminent and nearly an equal degree—the two precious metals, as they are called—gold and silver. Some nations have accordingly attempted to compose their circulating medium of these two metals indiscriminately.
There is an obvious convenience in making use of the more costly metal for larger payments, and the cheaper one for smaller; and the only question relates to the mode in which this can best be done. The mode most frequently adopted has been to establish between the two metals a fixed proportion [to decide by law, for example, that sixteen grains of silver should be equivalent to one grain of gold]; and it being left free to every one who has a [dollar] to pay, either to pay it in the one metal or in the other.
If [their] natural or cost values always continued to bear the same ratio to one another, the arrangement would be unobjectionable. This, however, is far from being the fact. Gold and silver, though the least variable in value of all commodities, are not invariable, and do not always vary simultaneously. Silver, for example, was lowered in permanent value more than gold by the discovery of the American mines; and those small variations of value which take place occasionally do not affect both metals alike. Suppose such a variation to take place—the value of the two metals relatively to one another no longer agreeing with their rated proportion—one or other of them will now be rated below its bullion value, and there will be a profit to be made by melting it.
Suppose, for example, that gold rises in value relatively to silver, so that the quantity of gold in a sovereign is now worth more than the quantity of silver in twenty shillings. Two consequences will ensue. No debtor will any longer find it his interest to pay in gold. He will always pay in silver, because twenty shillings are a legal tender for a debt of one pound, and he can procure silver convertible into twenty shillings for less gold than that contained in a sovereign. The other consequence will be that, unless a sovereign can be sold for more than twenty shillings, all the sovereigns will be melted, since as bullion they will purchase a greater number of shillings than they exchange for as coin. The converse of all this would happen if silver, instead of gold, were the metal which had risen in comparative value. A sovereign would not now be worth so much as twenty shillings, and whoever had a pound to pay would prefer paying it by a sovereign; while the silver coins would be collected for the purpose of being melted, and sold as bullion for gold at their real value—that is, above the legal valuation. The money of the community, therefore, would never really consist of both metals, but of the one only which, at the particular time, best suited the interest of debtors; and the standard of the currency would be constantly liable to change from the one metal to the other, at a loss, on each change, of the expense of coinage on the metal which fell out of use.
This is the operation by which is carried into effect the law of Sir Thomas Gresham (a merchant of the time of Elizabeth) to the purport that “money of less value drives out money of more value,” where both are legal payments among individuals. A celebrated instance is that where the clipped coins of England were received by the state on equal terms with new and perfect coin before 1695. They hanged men and women, but they did not prevent the operation of Gresham’s law and the disappearance of the perfect coins. When the state refused the clipped coins at legal value, by no longer receiving them in payment of taxes, the trouble ceased.(234) Jevons gives a striking illustration of the same law: “At the time of the treaty of 1858 between Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, which partially opened up the last country to European traders, a very curious system of currency existed in Japan. The most valuable Japanese coin was the kobang, consisting of a thin oval disk of gold about two inches long, and one and a quarter inch wide, weighing two hundred grains, and ornamented in a very primitive manner. It was passing current in the towns of Japan for four silver itzebus, but was worth in English money about 18_s._ 5_d._, whereas the silver itzebu was equal only to about 1_s._ 4_d._ [four itzebus being worth in English money 5_s._ 4_d._]. The earliest European traders enjoyed a rare opportunity for making profit. By buying up the kobangs at the native rating they trebled their money, until the natives, perceiving what was being done, withdrew from circulation the remainder of the gold.”(235)
It appears, therefore, that the value of money is liable to more frequent fluctuations when both metals are a legal tender at a fixed valuation than when the exclusive standard of the currency is either gold or silver. Instead of being only affected by variations in the cost of production of one metal, it is subject to derangement from those of two. The particular kind of variation to which a currency is rendered more liable by having two legal standards is a fall of value, or what is commonly called a depreciation, since practically that one of the two metals will always be the standard of which the real has fallen below the rated value. If the tendency of the metals be to rise in value, all payments will be made in the one which has risen least; and, if to fall, then in that which has fallen most.
While liable to “more frequent fluctuations,” prices do not follow the _extreme_ fluctuations of both metals, as some suppose, and as is shown by the following diagram.(236) A represents the line of the value of gold, and B of silver, relatively to some third commodity represented by the horizontal line. Superposing these curves, C would show the line of _extreme_ variations, while since prices would follow the metal which _falls_ in value, D would show the actual course of variations. While the fluctuations are more frequent in D, they are less extreme than in C.
[Illustration.]
Chart showing the line of prices under a double standard.
§ 2. The use of the two metals as money, and the management of Subsidiary Coins.
The plan of a double standard is still occasionally brought forward by here and there a writer or orator as a great improvement in currency.
It is probable that, with most of its adherents, its chief merit is its tendency to a sort of depreciation, there being at all times abundance of supporters for any mode, either open or covert, of lowering the standard. [But] the advantage without the disadvantages of a double standard seems to be best obtained by those nations with whom one only of the two metals is a legal tender, but the other also is coined, and allowed to pass for whatever value the market assigns to it.
When this plan is adopted, it is naturally the more costly metal which is left to be bought and sold as an article of commerce. But nations which, like England, adopt the more costly of the two as their standard, resort to a different expedient for retaining them both in circulation, namely (1), to make silver a legal tender, but only for small payments. In England no one can be compelled to receive silver in payment for a larger amount than forty shillings. With this regulation there is necessarily combined another, namely (2), that silver coin should be rated, in comparison with gold, somewhat above its intrinsic value; that there should not be, in twenty shillings, as much silver as is worth a sovereign; for, if there were, a very slight turn of the market in its favor would make it worth more than a sovereign, and it would be profitable to melt the silver coin. The overvaluation of the silver coin creates an inducement to buy silver and send it to the mint to be coined, since it is given back at a higher value than properly belongs to it; this, however, has been guarded against (3) by limiting the quantity of the silver coinage, which is not left, like that of gold, to the discretion of individuals, but is determined by the Government, and restricted to the amount supposed to be required for small payments. The only precaution necessary is, not to put so high a valuation upon the silver as to hold out a strong temptation to private coining.
§ 3. The experience of the United States with a double standard from 1792 to 1883.
The experience of the United States with a double standard, extending as it does from 1792 to 1873 without a break, and from 1878 to the present time, is a most valuable source of instruction in regard to the practical working of bimetallism. While we have nominally had a double standard, in reality we have either had one alone, or been in a transition from one to the other standard; and the history of our coinage strikingly illustrates the truth that the natural values of the two metals, in spite of all legislation, so vary relatively to each other that a constant ratio can not be maintained for any length of time; and that “the poor money drives out the good,” according to Gresham’s statement. For clearness, the period may be divided, in accordance with the changes of legislation, into four divisions:
I. 1792-1834. Transition from gold to silver.
II. 1834-1853. Transition from silver to gold.