Principles of Political Economy

John Stuart Mill

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The rent of all land is measured by the excess of the return to the whole capital employed on it above what is necessary to replace the capital with the ordinary rate of profit, or, in other words, above what the same capital would yield if it were all employed in as disadvantageous circumstances as the least productive portion of it: whether that least productive portion of capital is rendered so by being employed on the worst soil, or by being expended in extorting more produce from land which already yielded as much as it could be made to part with on easier terms. It will be true that the farmer requires the ordinary rate of profit on the whole of his capital; that whatever it returns to him beyond this he is obliged to pay to the landlord, but will not consent to pay more; that there is a portion of capital applied to agriculture in such circumstances of productiveness as to yield only the ordinary profits; and that the difference between the produce of this and of any other capital of similar amount is the measure of the tribute which that other capital can and will pay, under the name of rent, to the landlord. This constitutes a law of rent, as near the truth as such a law can possibly be; though of course modified or disturbed, in individual cases, by pending contracts, individual miscalculations, the influence of habit, and even the particular feelings and dispositions of the persons concerned. The law of rent, in the economic sense, operates in the United States as truly as elsewhere, although there is no separate class of landlords here. With us, almost all land is owned by the cultivator; so that two functions, those of the landlord and farmer, are both united in one person. Although one payment is made, it is still just as distinctly made up of two parts, one of which is a payment to the owner for the superior quality of his soil, and the other a payment (to the same person, if the owner is the cultivator) of profit on the farmer’s working capital. Land which in the United States will only return enough to pay a profit on this capital can not pay any rent. And land which can pay more than a profit on this working capital, returns that excess as rent, even if the farmer is also the owner and landlord. The principle which regulates the amount of that excess—which is the essential point—is the principle which determines the amount of economic rent, and it holds true in the United States or Finland, provided only that different grades of land are called into cultivation. The governing principle is the same, no matter whether a payment is made to one man as profit and to another as rent, or whether the two payments are made to the same man in two capacities. It has been urged that the law of rent does not hold in the United States, because “the price of grain and other agricultural produce has not risen in proportion to the increase of our numbers, as it ought to have done if Ricardo’s theory were true, but has fallen, since 1830, though since that time our population has been more than tripled.”(181) This overlooks the fact that we have not even yet taken up all our best agricultural lands, so that for some products the law of diminishing productiveness has not yet shown itself. The reason is, that the extension of our railway system has only of late years brought the really good grain-lands into cultivation. The fact that there has been no rise in agricultural products is due to the enormous extent of marvelously fertile grain-lands in the West, and to the cheapness of transportation from those districts to the seaboard. For a general understanding of the law of rent the following table will show how, under constant increase of population (represented by four different advances of population, in the first column), first the best and then the poorer lands are brought into cultivation. We will suppose (1) that the most fertile land, A, at first pays no rent; then (2), when more food is wanted than land A can supply, it will be profitable to till land B, but which, as yet, pays no rent. But if eighteen bushels are a sufficient return to a given amount of labor and capital, then when an equal amount of labor and capital engaged on A returns twenty-four bushels, six of that are beyond the ordinary profit, and form the rent on land A, and so on; C will next be the line of comparison, and then D; as the poorer soils are cultivated, the rent of A increases: Population A B C D Increase. 24 18 12 6 bushels bushels bushels bushels Total Rent in Total Rent in Total Rent in Total Rent in product Bushels product Bushels product Bushels product Bushels I. 24 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. II. 24 6 18 0 .. .. .. .. III. 24 12 18 6 12 0 .. .. IV. 24 18 18 12 12 6 6 0 § 5. Opposing Views of the Law of Rent. Under the name of rent, many payments are commonly included, which are not a remuneration for the original powers of the land itself, but for capital expended on it. The buildings are as distinct a thing from the farm as the stock or the timber on it; and what is paid for them can no more be called rent of land than a payment for cattle would be, if it were the custom that the landlord should stock the farm for the tenant. The buildings, like the cattle, are not land, but capital, regularly consumed and reproduced; and all payments made in consideration for them are properly interest. But with regard to capital actually sunk in improvements, and not requiring periodical renewal, but spent once for all in giving the land a permanent increase of productiveness, it appears to me that the return made to such capital loses altogether the character of profits, and is governed by the principles of rent. It is true that a landlord will not expend capital in improving his estate unless he expects from the improvement an increase of income surpassing the interest of his outlay. Prospectively, this increase of income may be regarded as profit; but, when the expense has been incurred and the improvement made, the rent of the improved land is governed by the same rules as that of the unimproved. Mr. Carey (as well as Bastiat) has declared that there is a law of increasing returns from land. He points out that everything now existing could be reproduced to-day at a less cost than that involved in its original production, owing to our advance in skill, knowledge, and all the arts of production; that, for example, it costs less to make an axe now than it did five hundred years ago; so also with a farm, since a farm of a given amount of productiveness can be brought into cultivation at less cost to-day than that originally spent upon it. The gain of society has, we all admit, been such that we produce almost everything at a less cost now than long ago; but to class a farm and an axe together overlooks, in the most remarkable way, the fact that land can not be created by labor and capital, while axes can, and that too indefinitely. Nor can the _produce_ from the land be increased indefinitely at a diminishing cost. This is sometimes denied by the appeal to facts: “It can be abundantly proved that, if we take any two periods sufficiently distant to afford a fair test, whether fifty or one hundred or five hundred years, the production of the land relatively to the labor employed upon it has progressively become greater and greater.”(182) But this does not prove that an existing tendency to diminishing returns has not been more than offset by the progress of the arts and improvements. “The advance of a ship against wind and tide is [no] proof that there is no wind and tide.” In a work entitled “The Past, the Present, and the Future,” Mr. Carey takes [a] ground of objection to the Ricardo theory of rent, namely, that in point of historical fact the lands first brought under cultivation are not the most fertile, but the barren lands. “We find the settler invariably occupying the high and thin lands requiring little clearing and no drainage. With the growth of population and wealth, other soils yielding a larger return to labor are always brought into activity, with a constantly increasing return to the labor expended upon them.” In whatever order the lands come into cultivation, those which when cultivated yield the least return, in proportion to the labor required for their culture, will always regulate the price of agricultural produce; and all other lands will pay a rent simply equivalent to the excess of their produce over this minimum. Whatever unguarded expressions may have been occasionally used in describing the law of rent, these two propositions are all that was ever intended by it. If, indeed, Mr. Carey could show that the return to labor from the land, agricultural skill and science being supposed the same, is not a diminishing return, he would overthrow a principle much more fundamental than any law of rent. But in this he has wholly failed. Another objection taken against the law of diminishing returns, and so against the law of rent, is that the potential increase of food, e.g., of a grain of wheat, is far greater than that of man.(183) No one disputes the fact that one grain of wheat can reproduce itself more times than man, and that too in a geometric increase; but not without land. A grain of wheat needs land in which it can multiply itself, and this necessary element of its increase is limited; and it is the very thing which limits the multiplication of the grains of wheat. On the same piece of land, one can not get more than what comes from one act of reproduction in the grain. If one grain produces 100 of its kind, doubling the capital will not repeatedly cause a geometric increase in the ratio of reproduction of each grain on this same land, so that one grain, by one process, produces of its kind 200, 400, 800, or 1,600, because you can not multiply the land in any such ratio as would accompany this potential reduplication of the grain. This objection would not seem worth answering, were it not that it furnishes some difficulty to really honest inquirers. Others, again, allege as an objection against Ricardo, that if all land were of equal fertility it might still yield a rent. But Ricardo says precisely the same. It is also distinctly a portion of Ricardo’s doctrine that, even apart from differences of situation, the land of a country supposed to be of uniform fertility would, all of it, on a certain supposition, pay rent, namely, if the demand of the community required that it should all be cultivated, and cultivated beyond the point at which a further application of capital begins to be attended with a smaller proportional return. This is simply the question, before discussed, whether, if only one class of land were cultivated, some agricultural capital would pay rent or not. It all depends on the fact whether population—and so the demand for food—has increased to the point where it calls out a recognition of the diminishing productiveness of the soil. In that case different capitals would be invested, so that there would be different returns to the same amount of capital; and the prior or more advantageous investments of capital on the land would yield more than the ordinary rate of profit, which could be claimed as rent. A. L. Perry(184) admits the law of diminishing returns, but holds that, “as land is capital, and as every form of capital may be loaned or rented, and thus become fruitful in the hands of another, the rent of land does not differ essentially in its nature from the rent of buildings in cities, or from the interest of money.” Henry George admits Ricardo’s law of rent to its full extent, but very curiously says: “Irrespective of the increase of population, the effect of improvements in methods of production and exchange is to increase rent.... The effect of labor-saving improvements will be to increase the production of wealth. Now, for the production of wealth, two things are required, labor and land. Therefore, the effect of labor-saving improvements will be to _extend the demand for land_, and, wherever the limit of the quality of land in use is reached, to bring into cultivation lands of less natural productiveness, or to extend cultivation on the same lands to a point of lower natural productiveness. And thus, while the primary effect of labor-saving improvements is to increase the power of labor, the secondary effect is to extend cultivation, and, where this lowers the margin of cultivation, to increase rent.”(185) Francis Bowen(186) rejects Ricardo’s law, and says, “Rent depends, not on the increase, but on the distribution, of the population”—asserting that the existence of large cities and towns determines the amount of rent paid by neighboring land.(187) § 6. Rent does not enter into the Cost of Production of Agricultural Produce. Rent does not really form any part of the expenses of [agricultural] production, or of the advances of the capitalist. The grounds on which this assertion was made are now apparent. It is true that all tenant-farmers, and many other classes of producers, pay rent. But we have now seen that whoever cultivates land, paying a rent for it, gets in return for his rent an instrument of superior power to other instruments of the same kind for which no rent is paid. The superiority of the instrument is in exact proportion to the rent paid for it. If a few persons had steam-engines of superior power to all others in existence, but limited by physical laws to a number short of the demand, the rent which a manufacturer would be willing to pay for one of these steam-engines could not be looked upon as an addition to his outlay, because by the use of it he would save in his other expenses the equivalent of what it cost him: without it he could not do the same quantity of work, unless at an additional expense equal to the rent. The same thing is true of land. The real expenses of production are those incurred on the worst land, or by the capital employed in the least favorable circumstances. This land or capital pays, as we have seen, no rent, but the expenses to which it is subject cause all other land or agricultural capital to be subjected to an equivalent expense in the form of rent. Whoever does pay rent gets back its full value in extra advantages, and the rent which he pays does not place him in a worse position than, but only in the same position as, his fellow-producer who pays no rent, but whose instrument is one of inferior efficiency. Soils are of every grade: some, which if cultivated, might replace the capital, but give no profit; some give a slight but not an ordinary profit; some, the ordinary profit. That is, “there is a point up to which it is profitable to cultivate, and beyond which it is not profitable to cultivate. The price of corn will not, for any long time, remain at a higher rate than is sufficient to cover with ordinary profit the cost of that portion of the general crop which is raised at greatest expense.”(188) For similar reasons the price will not remain at a lower rate. If, then, the cost of production of grain is determined by that land which replaces the capital, yields only the ordinary profit, and pays no rent, rent forms no part of this cost, since that land does not and can not pay any rent. McLeod,(189) however, says it is not the cost of production which regulates the value of agricultural produce, but the value which regulates the cost. BOOK III. EXCHANGE. Chapter I. Of Value. § 1. Definitions of Value in Use, Exchange Value, and Price. It is evident that, of the two great departments of Political Economy, the production of wealth and its distribution, the consideration of Value has to do with the latter alone; and with that only so far as competition, and not usage or custom, is the distributing agency. The use of a thing, in political economy, means its capacity to satisfy a desire, or serve a purpose. Diamonds have this capacity in a high degree, and, unless they had it, would not bear any price. Value in use, or, as Mr. De Quincey calls it, _teleologic_ value, is the extreme limit of value in exchange. The exchange value of a thing may fall short, to any amount, of its value in use; but that it can ever exceed the value in use implies a contradiction; it supposes that persons will give, to possess a thing, more than the utmost value which they themselves put upon it, as a means of gratifying their inclinations. The word Value, when used without adjunct, always means, in political economy, value in exchange. Exchange value requires to be distinguished from Price. Writers have employed Price to express the value of a thing in relation to money—the quantity of money for which it will exchange. By the price of a thing, therefore, we shall henceforth understand its value in money; by the value, or exchange value of a thing, its general power of purchasing; the command which its possession gives over purchasable commodities in general. What is meant by command over commodities in general? The same thing exchanges for a greater quantity of some commodities, and for a very small quantity of others. A coat may exchange for less bread this year than last, if the harvest has been bad, but for more glass or iron, if a tax has been taken off those commodities, or an improvement made in their manufacture. Has the value of the coat, under these circumstances, fallen or risen? It is impossible to say: all that can be said is, that it has fallen in relation to one thing, and risen in respect to another. Suppose, for example, that an invention has been made in machinery, by which broadcloth could be woven at half the former cost. The effect of this would be to lower the value of a coat, and, if lowered by this cause, it would be lowered not in relation to bread only or to glass only, but to all purchasable things, except such as happened to be affected at the very time by a similar depressing cause. Those [changes] which originate in the commodities with which we compare it affect its value in relation to those commodities; but those which originate in itself affect its value in relation to all commodities. There is such a thing as a general rise of prices. All commodities may rise in their money price. But there can not be a general rise of values. It is a contradiction in terms. A can only rise in value by exchanging for a greater quantity of B and C; in which case these must exchange for a smaller quantity of A. All things can not rise relatively to one another. If one half of the commodities in the market rise in exchange value, the very terms imply a fall of the other half; and, reciprocally, the fall implies a rise. Things which are exchanged for one another can no more all fall, or all rise, than a dozen runners can each outrun all the rest, or a hundred trees all overtop one another. A general rise or a general fall of prices is merely tantamount to an alteration in the value of money, and is a matter of complete indifference, save in so far as it affects existing contracts for receiving and paying fixed pecuniary amounts. Before commencing the inquiry into the laws of value and price, I have one further observation to make. I must give warning, once for all, that the cases I contemplate are those in which values and prices are determined by competition alone. In so far only as they are thus determined, can they be reduced to any assignable law. The buyers must be supposed as studious to buy cheap as the sellers to sell dear. The reader is advised to study the definitions of value given by other writers. Cairnes(190) defines value as “the ratio in which commodities in open market are exchanged against each other.” F. A. Walker(191) holds that “value is the power which an article confers upon its possessor, irrespective of legal authority or personal sentiments, of commanding, in exchange for itself, the labor, or the products of the labor, of others.” Carey(192) says, “Value is the measure of the resistance to be overcome in obtaining those commodities or things required for our purposes—of the power of nature over man.” Value is thus, with him, the antithesis of wealth, which is (according to Carey) the power of man over nature. In this school, value is the service rendered by any one who supplies the article for the use of another. This is also Bastiat’s idea,(193) “_le rapport de deux services échangés_.” Following Bastiat, A. L. Perry(194) defines value as “always and everywhere the relation of mutual purchase established between two services by their exchange.” Roscher(195) explains exchange value as “the quality which makes them exchangeable against other goods.” He also makes a distinction between utility and value in use: “Utility is a quality of things themselves, in relation, it is true, to human wants. Value in use is a quality imputed to them, the result of man’s thought, or his view of them. Thus, for instance, in a beleaguered city, the stores of food do not increase in utility, but their value in use does.” Levasseur(196) regards value as “the relation resulting from exchange”—_le rapport resultant de l’échange_. Cherbuliez(197) asserts that “the value of a product or of a service can be expressed only as the products or services which it obtains in exchange.... If I exchange the thing A against B, A is the value of B, B is the value of A.” Jevons(198) defines value as “proportion in exchange.” § 2. Conditions of Value: Utility, Difficulty of Attainment, and Transferableness. That a thing may have any value in exchange, two conditions are necessary. 1. It must be of some use; that is (as already explained), it must conduce to some purpose, satisfy some desire. No one will pay a price, or part with anything which serves some of his purposes, to obtain a thing which serves none of them. 2. But, secondly, the thing must not only have some utility, there must also be some difficulty in its attainment. The question is one as to the conditions essential to the existence of any value. Very justly Cairnes(199) adds also a third condition, “the possibility of transferring the possession of the articles which are the subject of the exchange.” For instance, a cargo of wheat at the bottom of the sea has value in use and difficulty of attainment, but it is not transferable. Jevons (following J. B. Say) maintains that “value depends entirely on utility.” If utility means the power to satisfy a desire, things which merely have utility and no difficulty of attainment could have no exchange value.(200) F. A. Walker(201) believes that “value depends wholly on the relation between demand and supply.” Carey(202) holds that value depends merely on the cost of reproduction of the given article. Roscher(203) finds that exchange value is “based on a combination of value in use with cost value.” Cherbuliez(204) calls the conditions of value two, “the ability to give satisfaction, and inability of attainment without effort. The first element is subjective; it is determined wholly by the needs or desires of the parties to the exchange. The second is objective; it depends upon material considerations, which are the conditions of the existence of the thing, and upon which the needs of the persons exchanging have no influence whatever.” It is, as usual, one of Cherbuliez’s clear expositions. A. L. Perry(205) states that, “while value always takes its rise in the _desires_ of men, it is never realized except through the _efforts_ of men, and through these efforts as mutually exchanged.” The difficulty of attainment which determines value is not always the same kind of difficulty: (1.) It sometimes consists in an absolute limitation of the supply. There are things of which it is physically impossible to increase the quantity beyond certain narrow limits. Such are those wines which can be grown only in peculiar circumstances of soil, climate, and exposure. Such also are ancient sculptures; pictures by the old masters; rare books or coins, or other articles of antiquarian curiosity. Among such may also be reckoned houses and building-ground, in a town of definite extent. De Quincey(206) has presented some ingenious diagrams to represent the operations of the two constituents of value in each of the three following cases: U represents the power of the article to satisfy some desire, and D difficulty of attainment. In the first case, exchange value is not hindered by D from going up to any height, and so it rises and falls entirely according to the force of U. D being practically infinite, the horizontal line, exchange value, is not kept down by D, but it rises just as far as U, the desires of purchasers, may carry it.